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This volume is concerned with the historical and sociological processes by which status, 
authority and credibility have been gained, lost and perhaps regained in the long history of 
atmospheric and climate change knowledges. It is concerned with how different expert 
‘consensi’ have emerged as authoritative statements at different times; with how narratives of 
climatic change have escaped the discursive clutches of their originators to become central – 
if often contested – objects of political concern; and with how any lost forms of scientific 
credibility or authority may be regained – not through the application of more or better 
science, but through reconsideration of the institutions from which putative consensi emerge.  
It has become something of a truism in history of science to claim that ‘science’ is 
constituted by situated, local practices of knowledge production and of social warranting. We 
might say that science is made of places – we cannot understand either the cognitive content 
of scientific knowledge or its cultural authority without understanding the specific places and 
spaces where knowledge is constructed and circulates. Work on the historical geographies 
and sociologies of science has insisted on the mutual constitution of the cognitive, the social 
and the spatial, in studies for example of the gentlemanly laboratory spaces of 
Enlightenment-era natural philosophy (Shapin 1988; Withers & Livingstone 1999), and of the 
networks of privileged virtual witnesses who offered early experimentalists a source of 
epistemic and cultural reinforcement for their contested claims to reliable knowledge (Shapin 
& Schaffer 1985). 
Geographers of science thus view science as a geographical phenomenon. Scholars 
such as David Livingstone (2003), Charles Withers (2010) and Richard Powell (2007), with 
periodic encouragement from the likes of Steven Shapin (2003), have come to position space 
as a constitutive element of scientific practice, and not just another ‘factor’ in the history of 
science, like class, race or gender. “Spatiality”, argues Shapin (2003, 90), “is a necessary 
condition for there being such a thing as science … Where else could science take place but 
in places, and how else could it travel but across spaces? Relevant differences and similarities 
between places are empirical matters, as are the means by which, and the efficiency with 
which, science travels across various spaces”. 
In this paper I explore this question of travelling science in the case of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the producer of the most comprehensive, 
influential and scrutinised assessments of the sciences of climate change. In so doing, I seek 
to link the question of travelling science to that of credibility. In Shapin’s (1995) treatment of 
credibility, he positions it at the heart of the challenge of epistemology. He suggests that 
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science proceeds through the production of metonymic statements – “x stands for y”, and that 
“All testimony about states of affairs stand in a metonymic relationship to those states of 
affairs, and the condition of your knowing about these things – otherwise unavailable to you 
– is your accepting the legitimacy of that relationship. Accordingly … you are dependent on 
some practical resolution to the problem of credibility” (ibid., 261). 
By “practical resolution”, Shapin refers to the “contingent social and cultural practices” 
by which individual beliefs are translated into collectively-held knowledge. Credibility may 
arise from personal familiarity. It may mean deference to authoritative persons or institutions, 
or it may suggest an allegiance between particular scientific claims and particular cultural and 
political contexts. Credibility is, in this sense, distinct from questions of procedural validity 
(Bloor 1976). Like space, credibility is positioned by Shapin as a constitutive entity of 
scientific practice – the construction of science is the construction of credibility. 
Understanding the geographies of credibility is therefore inseparable from understanding the 
geographies of scientific knowledge.  
Shapin is alert to the conceptual confluence of space and credibility. For shared belief 
to be constructed between or outside of expert groups, “it must travel great distances, in both 
physical and cultural space” (1995, 270). Where personal familiarity is lacking, Shapin 
suggests, the “inducements to distrust and scepticism” are high (ibid.). One doesn’t need to 
inquire deeply into the recent history of climate politics to see that it offers fertile ground for 
those interested in the phenomena of trust and scepticism in the boundary spaces of science 
and public policy (e.g. Hulme 2009; Jasanoff 2011; Beck 2012).  
The production of credible metonymic statements about the state of the climate has 
always been a challenging task. As individuals, we are unable to perceive the subtle changes 
in atmospheric chemistry, thermal energy, and meteorological patterns which are the 
hallmarks – the traces – of both natural variability and anthropogenic climate change. 
Practical resolutions to the problem of credibility have therefore been at the heart of efforts to 
institutionalize the sciences of climate change, as I will show below. The problematic 
metonymics of climate change are rendered all the more acute as the horizons of knowledge 
and action extend far into the future, well beyond the capacity of individuals, unless they 
have built their own climate models or crystal balls, to test the legitimacy of statements that 
future x stands for future y.  
This problematic raises questions of epistemic monopoly. For Zygmunt Bauman, 
certain esoteric objects of scientific inquiry “appear only under very special circumstances, to 
which no one else has access: on the screen of a multi-million-dollar accelerator, in the lens 
of a gigantic telescope” or, we might add, in the code and output of global climate models. 
Bauman goes on, “Only the scientists can see them and experiment with them; these objects 
and events are, so to speak, a monopolistic possession of the given branch of science…Being 
the sole owners of the experience which provides the raw material for their study, the 
scientists are in full control of the way the material is construed, processes, analysed, 
interpreted, narrated” (Bauman 1992, 72). However, this picture of “full control” over 
knowledge construction and framing is problematised by an institution like the IPCC – a 
hybrid space at the boundaries of science and politics. Here, scientists and government 
delegates gather in the same settings to scope-out reports, review their contents, and approve 
the final wording of the most high-profile and potentially consequential knowledge claims to 
emerge out of the assessment process. Together, these actors engage in what sociologist 
Clark Miller (2001) labels ‘hybrid management’ of the science-politics boundary.  
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Gaining it – authoritative hybrids and credible knowledge 
The IPCC is an experiment. It is an experiment in bringing-together knowledge on an 
international stage about a global problem of unmatched complexity. It is an experiment in 
the social organisation of knowledge production. It is an experiment in attaining political 
credibility and legitimacy for knowledge claims seen as having far-reaching implications for 
the organisation of contemporary and future societies. Like all experiments, its boundaries – 
institutional, epistemic, cultural – are not pre-ordained but are products of social negotiation 
and settlement (Galison 1987). The Panel, while formally based in Geneva, is predominantly 
constituted as a decentred and constantly evolving network of volunteer authors who conduct 
most of their work remotely from both the organisation’s centre and each other. A regular 
series of meetings at various levels of the organisation’s vertical hierarchy facilitate progress 
and coordination, leading to the publication approximately every six years of a three volume 
report in print and online. Current knowledge about climate change is presented across three 
relatively stabilised themes – the physical science relating to climate change (Working Group 
I), the potential impacts of a changing climate on human and natural systems (Working 
Group II), and the possible mitigation strategies that may be adopted (Working Group III). 
Draft chapters are produced by nominated and approved authors according to a largely 
preordained structure, before being reviewed by fellow experts and government 
representatives and being subsequently accepted for publication. Five complete assessment 
reports have so far been published – in 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007 and 2014. These voluminous 
assessments have been interspersed with periodic ‘special reports’ on more focused topics, 
such as extreme weather (IPCC 2011). 
The official constitution of the IPCC took place in Geneva, at the first meeting of the 
Panel in November 1988. The establishment of the Panel was a joint initiative of the World 
Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), both subsidiaries of the UN, which itself formally recognised the action in 
Resolution 43/53, adopted by the UN General Assembly in New York on 6th December 1988. 
Shardul Agrawala (1998a) suggests that four main actors were key to the formation of the 
IPCC: the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) and the United 
States Government. Despite the consensus expressed at the Villach climate science 
conferences of the mid-1980s (which Agrawala contends was as great as that which led to the 
Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances), it was perceived by many that the political 
complexity of climate change was such that the Villach statements were insufficient to drive 
political action. In light of dissatisfaction with the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases 
(AGGG), a small advisory group set up in 1986 by WMO, UNEP and ICSU which was seen 
as underfunded and too distant from the policy process to be effective, calls were made – 
particularly by UNEP’s Mostafa Tolba – for a more comprehensive international assessment 
effort. Following various formative interactions between the US and WMO’s Executive 
Council (see Agrawala 1998a, 611) resolutions were made for WMO, in conjunction with 
UNEP, to work towards the establishment of an intergovernmental assessment body. 
The ‘intergovernmental’ form of the assessment body was largely a result of US 
demands, which Agrawala (1998a) attributes to diverging opinions about climate change 
between various US government agencies and the Republican White House administration. 
An intergovernmental mechanism emerged as a “common denominator agreement” (ibid., 
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612) between competing factions in the US.
1
 Agrawala argues that the US administration 
(particularly the Department of Energy) was suspicious of any assessment conducted by 
experts who had not been governmentally accredited. The establishment of an 
intergovernmental mechanism also accorded with what appeared to be a reticence within the 
incumbent US administration to act on climate change immediately, and a desire to support 
more research before making political and economic commitments (ibid., 614). After much 
backroom negotiation between agencies in the US, a proposal was put to the WMO for a 
panel consisting of “representatives of countries making major contributions to various 
aspects of...climate change”, which should “allow for adequate representation of countries 
from all regions ... [while] ... representatives of ... international organizations should 
participate as observers” (US Draft Proposal, quoted in Agrawala 1998a, 615). 
Over its first assessment cycle (1988-1990), the IPCC operated in effect as the global 
setting for the negotiation of the science and politics of climate change. Working Group III 
was essentially a space for debating the merits of policy alternatives, whereas its next 
manifestation in 1995 was the more prosaically framed ‘Economic and Social Dimensions of 
Climate Change’. A number of developing countries expressed a dissatisfaction at the first 
report’s ambiguous positioning at the boundary of science and politics, and were wary of the 
IPCC becoming the only setting where a climate change governance architecture would be 
negotiated (Miller 2009). The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee was thus established 
in 1990 under the auspices of the UN, and was the institutional setting for the drafting of the 
UNFCCC (Bodansky 2001). This act of boundary making strengthened the IPCC’s self-
identification as a scientific body, with a discursive firewall established between deliberation 
which was ‘policy relevant’ but ‘policy neutral’, never ‘policy prescriptive’ (Shaw & 
Robinson 2004).  
These early negotiations and settlements produced an institution which is looked upon 
by many as a producer of robust, scientifically credible assessments of climate change which 
nonetheless offer useful inputs to policy processes (Hulme & Mahony 2010). The social 
authority of the IPCC was endorsed with the joint award of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize to the 
IPCC and to Al Gore, in recognition of their respective services to raising worldwide 
awareness of climate change. However, this path to prestige was by no means smooth. 
Losing it – the geographies of contested credibility 
Since the early debates about the proper institutional settings for scientific assessment 
and political deliberation, the IPCC’s institutional history has been marked by credibility 
struggles and ongoing ‘boundary work’, or efforts to define, rhetorically and practically, the 
boundary between science and politics (Gieryn 1983; 1999). This boundary work has 
proceeded alongside, and has perhaps been most heated in relation to, efforts to detect a 
change in the climate system and to attribute that change to human activities. It is this work 
of parsing-out the natural and the social in obsessively repeated simulations of the climate 
system which has given rise to the IPCC’s headline claims, such as “[m]ost of the observed 
increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the 
                                                          
1
 Agrawala also suggests that that the US’s insistence on such an organisation was a strategic move 
(by the US authorities and the WMO) to prevent UNEP’s Mostafa Tolba from exercising the kind 
discursive and political leverage over the climate issue which he had over the science and politics of 
ozone depletion (cf. Grundmann 2006). 
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observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations” (IPCC 2007a, 5). For Bruno Latour, 
this delineation of the natural and the social is deeply political: 
Researchers who establish a causal link between human action and global 
climate change ‘do politics’ in the sense of altering the associations – and 
thus directly the ‘social’ – that all beings establish with all other beings. They 
are thus engaged in a cosmology – a cosmopolitics – involving, in different 
ways, all the entities that previously did not count in the public understanding 
of problems (Latour 2012, 72). 
But the science of detection and attribution not only re-constitutes the social. It also 
plays upon the modernist boundary between the natural and the social and emphasises a 
renewed ontology of climatic hybridity (see also Latour 2013, 8). In Latourian terms, the 
‘cosmopolitical’ force of such claims is illustrated by the controversy which surrounded the 
detection and attribution chapter of the Second Assessment Report (SAR) in 1995, which was 
subject to criticism from actors concerned that the IPCC’s review process had been corrupted 
by authors making alterations to the chapter after its formal acceptance by government 
representatives (Edwards 1997; Edwards & Schneider 2001). Edwards & Schneider offer 
echoes of Polanyi’s (1962) scientific republicanism in their defence of the IPCC’s capacity 
for learning and development through ‘self-governance’. Yet the IPCC’s critics in this case 
embraced the quality assurance seemingly provided by peer review and governmental 
oversight, even though those sceptical of the reality and severity of climate change have often 
pointed to the intergovernmental nature of the IPCC as evidence of the political corruption of 
the scientific process (e.g. Laframboise 2012). 
Outside of the IPCC process itself and concerns over the scientific veracity of 
assessments, commentators have critiqued the kind of monopolising tendencies described by 
Zygmunt Bauman (see above). For Tol (2011), the IPCC has exercised an unhelpful 
monopoly over climate change debates. For Miller (2009), what he calls the ‘unitary 
globalism’ of the IPCC has been achieved at the expense of a politics of climate which is able 
to embrace a variety of different knowledges and modes of reasoning about environmental 
risk and possible political responses. The IPCC’s unitary globalism has arisen from the 
discursive dominance of the natural sciences in the assessment process (Bjurström & Polk 
2011), and from the construction of a linear, deterministic relationship between computer 
modelling and understandings of human responses to environmental change (Beck 2011; 
Hulme 2011; Nielsen & Sejersen 2012).  
Myanna Lahsen (2004; 2007) translates these concerns into a Gramscian language of 
power and hegemony. The hegemony of certain scientific framings of climate change and 
potential response strategies for her is not just about disciplinary hierarchies. Rather, through 
her study of scientific and political communities in Brazil, she has shown how science is seen 
to function as a vector of hegemonic power, co-produced with the economic and political 
dominance of northern states. She draws attention to the suspicion felt by her Brazilian 
interview respondents of the narratives and framings put forward by the IPCC, particularly 
those relating to the Amazon rainforest, its fate under a changing climate, and the potential 
for using the forest as a ‘sink’ for accumulated greenhouse gases. This science is not seen as 
being an apolitical victim of political manipulation by hegemonic forces. Rather, the science 
is political. It ties together entities of the material world in new, contestable ways, and is the 
locus of a politics that would interfere with the political sovereignty and development rights 
of a country like Brazil (Lahsen 2007). Here, the construction of scientific credibility is not 
about the validity of climate modelling methodologies but about “inequities in national 
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capacities to produce and frame knowledge” (Lahsen, 2007: 178). It is about the postcolonial 
legacy of a “North-South divide” in political and economic power (Joshi 2013), and about the 
cognitive and normative priorities of diverse and dispersed communities of experts and 
decision-makers (Hulme 2010).  
The leadership of the IPCC has always been aware of this challenge of international 
credibility. Following Stephen Hilgartner's (2000) work on the significance of performance 
and staging in the credibility of regulatory science, we can read the institutional history of the 
IPCC as a history of performative stagings. Following the relatively low numbers of 
developing country experts present in the preparation of the first IPCC report (Jäger 2009: 
151), efforts were made to ensure better geographic representation. As early as 1989, action 
plans were drawn-up to widen participation, including the provision of financial support 
through a trust fund. The issue of participation was the only topic discussed at every IPCC 
Bureau session between 1989 and 1996, with the IPCC’s first chair Bert Bolin famously 
remarking in 1991 that,  
right now many countries, especially developing countries, simply do not 
trust assessments in which their scientists and policymakers have not 
participated. Don’t you think global credibility demands global representation? 
(quoted in Agrawala, 1998: 628)  
This oft-cited question represents an acknowledgement of the performative potential of broad 
participation, and an instrumental linking of participation to trust and credibility. 
Participation is not presented just as a means of widening the epistemic and deliberative 
profile of IPCC assessments by enrolling actors with diverse perspectives or worldviews, but 
as a means of ensuring broad governmental assent (cf. Fiorino 1990).  
The process of recruiting authors
2
 has thus become an important element of the 
IPCC’s efforts to attain international, public credibility. Although much of the recruitment 
process takes place ‘backstage’ (to use Hilgartner’s theatrical metaphor), away from public 
eyes, the presentation of IPCC products on the public stages of the popular media and the 
internet has increasingly featured statements and statistics describing the geographic diversity 
of the expertise represented in the reports. But, as Lahsen (2007) argues, this instrumental 
linking of participation and credibility may not hold true. The focus on widening participation 
obscures the deeper, structural questions of unequal scientific capacities. The act of 
participation does not necessarily lead to influence over report contents – indeed many 
scientists from countries like Brazil and India have reported feeling marginalised  in the face 
of a ‘core set’ of dominant (usually Western) experts (Kandlikar & Sagar 1999; Lahsen 2004). 
And participating scientists may not always be trusted by their own governments, who may 
be wary of their co-option into styles of thinking which are not conducive to the defence of 
particular normative commitments or national interests (Lahsen 2007; Fogel 2004). 
Lahsen’s (2007) account ends by speculating that the distrustful deconstruction of 
IPCC science as a vector of hegemonic political power is “likely to surface and shape global 
environmental politics more” if countries like Brazil, China and India encounter growing 
pressure to make binding commitments to emissions reductions. She also notes that scientific 
controversies have not driven or featured in Brazilian debates about climate science and 
politics thus far. Although the deconstruction of evidential claims often extends as far as such 
                                                          
2
 Authors are selected by Working Group chairs from lists of nominations prepared mostly by 
governments, but also by non-governmental observer organisations.  
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claims challenge powerful and easily identifiable economic and political interests (Lahsen 
2005; Oreskes & Conway 2010), moments of scientific controversy can also bring to light 
deeper questions about trust, authority, and the complicated intertwining of scientific 
knowledge and political action (Jasanoff 2004; Whatmore 2009). In short, controversies can 
lay bare the geographies of scientific credibility.  
In the rest of this paper, I want to hone in on Indian responses to an error which was 
identified in the 2007 IPCC report. I’ll draw on my own interviews with Indian scientists, 
policymakers, journalists and environmental campaigners, alongside documentary sources 
and media presentations of the controversy, to explore how the event re-animated a history of 
epistemic contestation around climate change. I’ll also seek to draw out some insights into 
the symbolic and performative politics of representation and participation in the IPCC 
process, before concluding with a look at subsequent attempts to reform the IPCC process 
and to regain lost credibility. 
‘Glaciergate’ 
In 2007, the IPCC report on climate change impacts and adaptation stated that 
“glaciers in the Himalayas are receding faster than in any other part of the world, and, if the 
present rate continues, the likelihood of them disappearing by the year 2035 and perhaps 
sooner is very high” (IPCC 2007b: 493). This probabilistically hedged prediction caused a 
mixture of alarm, unease and puzzlement in scientific and political circles in India. A 
summary statement about glaciers decaying rapidly by the 2030s was removed from the 
Summary of the WGII report following a comment from the Government of India that “This 
is a very drastic conclusion. Should have supporting evidence otherwise need [sic] to be 
deleted”.3 
The statement was removed from the WGII summary and did not appear in the overall 
synthesis summary. However, the underlying claim about glaciers disappearing by 2035 
remained in the report, and the claim garnered much media attention on its publication. 
Visual artists used the warning to frame creative efforts at generating awareness of the risks 
posed by climate change. John Kerry, then the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Chairman, argued in a 2009 speech that the rapidly melting glaciers risked inflaming military 
tensions on the India-Pakistan border, with environmental change potentially undoing the 
recent diplomatic gains that had been made in the perennial border conflict
4
.  
Around the same time as Kerry’s speech, the Indian Environment Minister Jairam 
Ramesh set about trying to settle the unease surrounding the 2035 claim. He had picked up on 
glaciologists’ uncertainty about the credibility of the claim, and commissioned a review of 
existing Indian studies of the Himalayan glaciers. The review reported a mixed picture of 
melting and advancing glaciers, and argued that no trend could be reliably attributed to 
anthropogenic climate change (Raina 2009). When this government review was reported on 
New Delhi Television, IPCC chair Rajendra Pachauri was invited to comment on the 
challenge posed to the IPCC claims about rapidly melting glaciers. Pachauri was dismissive, 
labelling the study “voodoo science”, and calling into question its procedural rigour and 
scientific credibility. In a later newspaper interview, Pachauri described the Indian 
                                                          
3
 WGII Summary for Policymakers, Government and Expert Review of Second Order Draft, August 
2006.  
4
 Hindustan Times, Kerry warns of escalation in Indo-Pak tension due to climatic changes. 17 June 
2009. 
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government as “arrogant” to question the link between climate change and rapidly melting 
glaciers.
5
 
Pachauri’s response betrays an unwillingness to seriously engage with knowledge 
claims which run counter to those assessed, accredited and authorised by the IPCC process. 
The absence of the conventional vanguards of scientific credibility – peer review and what 
Pachauri called “scientific citations” – enabled Pachauri to dismiss the report as politically 
motivated, even though he reported being unclear as to what the Minister’s motivations were6. 
Pachauri dismissed media statements by the Indian report’s author as being reminiscent of 
“schoolboy science” and “climate change deniers”.  For Pachauri the sole practical resolution 
to this credibility shortfall was the institutional mechanisms of scientific quality control 
which could cleanse these new claims of their political overtones and questionable epistemic 
underpinnings. Pachauri’s strident boundary work between credible and disreputable science 
would come back to haunt the IPCC hierarchy, as it emerged that the original 2035 claim had 
itself been based on some rather questionable, non-peer-reviewed sources, including a 
magazine interview with a glaciologist in 1999 (for a detailed analysis of the genealogy of the 
error, see Banerjee & Collins 2010).  
As more errors were discovered in the 2007 report, including one concerning the 
percentage of the Netherlands lying below sea-level, the Dutch Environmental Assessment 
Agency (PBL) was commissioned by the Dutch Government to conduct a review of the WGII 
assessment. An over-reliance on non-peer-reviewed ‘grey literature’ was one point of critique, 
alongside the occasional opacity of expert judgement and hard-to-trace referencing (PBL 
2010; see also Hajer 2012). In the Netherlands, anxieties in the political community about the 
credibility of IPCC assessments was dealt with both through forensic examination of the texts, 
and through the enactment of deliberative spaces in which dialogue between climate 
scientists, ‘sceptics’ and knowledge users could be enacted, such as weblogs and radio 
features. Maarten Hajer (2012) reports how the activities of the PBL in assessing the IPCC 
assessment drew ire from a large section of the climate science community who were wary of 
possible damage to the broader credibility of the IPCC. If the IPCC reports were to be so 
publicly poked and prodded for errors, then the general credibility of the IPCC as a producer 
of reliably metonymic statements about climate change could be thrown into doubt. The PBL, 
led by Hajer, countered that institutions like the IPCC needed to recognise that authority is 
constructed in modern, mediatised societies through communicative, rather than just 
epistemic, acts (Hajer 2009). As such, it was only through public performances of 
deliberation, for example between a climate scientist and a famous sceptic on a public 
website, that authority could be restored. But as Jasanoff (2005) has made clear, the cultural 
practices by which knowledge is rendered as authoritative and reliable in the public sphere 
vary greatly across different countries. Let us then turn back to India, where responses to the 
unearthing of the Himalaya error were very different to those in the Netherlands. What is 
particularly interesting is how the idea of the IPCC representing “Western science” was 
locally mobilised in this moment of controversy.  
Challenges to the so-called “Western science” of climate change have a long history 
in Indian environmental politics (e.g. Agarwal & Narain, 1991; Agarwal, Sharma, & Chopra, 
1982; Parashar et al., 1996). Epistemic contestation has most often taken place around claims 
                                                          
5
 The Guardian, India “arrogant” to deny global warming link to melting glaciers, 9 November 2009. 
6
 Prominent environmental campaigner Sunita Narain also expressed uncertainty about the Minister’s 
motivations – “the report [will] create a lot of confusion…I am not sure what Jairam is doing” (ibid.). 
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about India’s contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. Challenges have been made 
both to the accuracy of emissions estimates, and to the moral politics of discounting the 
historical contributions of Western nations to global emissions in efforts to divide-up the 
responsibility for cuts. As in Brazil (Lahsen 2007), “Western science” and institutions like 
the IPCC have been read as vectors of hegemonic power, with Indian politicians and 
scientists often suspicious of the political motivations underpinning certain ways of framing 
and narrating the science of climate change (Kandlikar & Sagar 1999; Biermann 2001). 
Jairam Ramesh, the Environment Minister from 2009 to 2011, traded on these suspicions in 
his response to the IPCC glacier controversy. In telling the Guardian that he was prepared to 
take on “the doomsday scenarios of Al Gore and the IPCC”, he related that his “concern is 
that this comes from western scientists”7.  
In November 2009, the Hindustan Times reported that “For the first time, the Indian 
government has challenged research that says global warming has hastened the melting of 
Himalayan glaciers”8. A few months later, another report paraphrased Ramesh as saying that 
“the Western countries”, Ramesh felt, “used the IPCC report to pressurise India to come on 
board to accept mitigation targets, which was successfully rejected”9. In a foreword to an 
assessment report of the new Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment, dubbed by 
some an “Indian IPCC” (see Mahony 2014), Ramesh argued for the development of 
“indigenous capacity” in climate change measurement and modelling. He stated that “[w]e 
should not be dependent on external studies to tell us for example about the impact of climate 
change on our glaciers, on our monsoons, and indeed even on sea level rise. Indeed, recent 
evidence suggests the ‘scientific consensus’ on many of these is debatable” (INCCA 2010). 
At a launch of a government study of future Indian greenhouse gas emissions, Ramesh 
likewise remarked that “[w]e can no longer depend on derived science from the West”10. 
It is not necessary to spend too much time considering whether the IPCC can be 
accurately characterised as “Western”. Such broad-brush Occidentalism can never do justice 
to the complex geographies of climate change knowledge production, but it is important to 
point out that certain framings and narrations of climate change which can be found within 
IPCC reports reflect situated and contingent ways of framing the issue, which may not always 
be capable of global acceptance. For example, Fogel (2004; 2005) illustrates how the 
persistent presentation in successive IPCC reports of forest areas in the global South as 
‘empty spaces’ ripe for the sequestration of biotic carbon has helped legitimate forestry 
projects which prioritise the offsetting of distant greenhouse gas emissions over the needs and 
desires of local residents. Scientific framings of such forests as exploitable resources erase 
local histories and politics, leading many politicians, scientists and activists in the global 
South to grow sceptical of the politico-epistemic entanglings of IPCC assessments of 
mitigation strategies.  The persistent use of the notion of “Western science” as a discursive 
resource or leitmotif which periodically animates the politics of science in such debates raises 
questions about the geographies of scientific credibility.  Sense cannot be made of this 
discourse without reference to the legacy of Western colonialism and its socioeconomic and 
environmental consequences. In the Indian context specifically, we cannot ignore the legacy 
of a political aesthetics of national autonomy which guided much pre- and post-independence 
                                                          
7
 The Guardian, India “arrogant” to deny global warming link to melting glaciers, 9 November 2009. 
8
 Hindustan Times, Government quells panic over Himalayan glacial melt. 10 November 2009. 
9
 Hindustan Times, Won’t let Pachauri down in IPCC: Govt., 16 March 2010. 
10
 SciDev.Net, Home-grown climate models ‘set India’s record straight’, 8 September 2009. On the 
discursive co-production of epistemic and political sovereignty in Indian climate politics, see author 
(2014). 
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political thought and which played into Nehruvian policies of industrial import substitution 
and science-led developmentalism in the post-independence era (Zachariah 2005).  
However, it is also highly significant that 2009 was a year in which momentum was 
supposedly building for a new global deal on emissions reductions at the Copenhagen climate 
talks. As Lahsen (2007) predicted, the politics of science was re-animated by heightened 
expectations of an international political deal on mitigation. At the time of the controversy, 
Jairam Ramesh was walking a political tightrope between seeking to engage proactively with 
the climate talks and key actors like the US, and seeking not to alienate a domestic political 
audience opposed to binding emissions cuts and sensitive to the erosion of national political 
sovereignty (Dubash 2013; Atteridge et al. 2012). By playing on a discourse of contested 
‘Western science’, Ramesh could tap into this demand for sovereignty and autonomy, for a 
defence of the national interest, even as he edged closer to an international agreement on 
climate change mitigation.  
The arguments about Western science being a political instrument stand in a 
complicated relationship to the question of participation in the IPCC process. Participation by 
Indian experts has always been relatively low (Kandlikar & Sagar 1999; Ho-Lem et al. 2011), 
and participating authors have reported feeling marginalised in the report-writing process, 
both in interviews with Frank Biermann in the late 1990s  (Biermann 2001) and in my own 
interviews in 2012, in the aftermath of the ‘Glaciergate’ controversy. However, contra 
Biermann, there were also Indian authors who felt surprisingly empowered by the AR4 
process, able to contribute on equal terms to the framing of report chapters and the broader 
setting of the terms of the debate. Nonetheless, this all serves to complicate any instrumental 
linking of participation to trust, credibility and acceptance. The chapter which featured the 
2035 melting glaciers claim had an Indian glaciologist as a coordinating lead author, 
alongside colleagues from the Philippines, Japan and China. Yet the decidedly non-Western 
make-up of the author team didn’t stop the political and media presentation of their report as 
something emanating from outside, from the “West”. 
The complications of these geographies of representation and credibility are made all 
the plainer when we consider the positionality of Rajendra Pachauri, the Indian chair of the 
IPCC, in this controversy. A formerly prominent Indian policymaker with involvement in 
climate change negotiations told me in an interview that “Pachauri is not very well received 
in India” among government actors, due to what he called “several manipulations”. My 
respondent stated that “he [i.e. Pachauri] wrote” the 2035 claim. The implication was that 
Pachauri had badly (and personally) betrayed the national interest. But when asked whether 
Pachauri should step-down, my respondent argued that the IPCC is an international body, and 
that it is important to have an Indian voice in such a prominent position.  
Here we can see echoes of Lahsen’s (2007) argument that trust in individuals (cf. 
Shapin 1995) is not neatly determined by nationality, particularly in the case of government 
actors and their scientific compatriots. Despite Pachauri seeking to staunchly defend the 
territory of a trans-national, autonomous science, he also played upon his own subjectivity. In 
seeking to link the tirade of criticism to which he was subject in late 2009 to powerful 
corporate interests, he told the Hindustan Times that “I am the easiest target as I represent the 
poor and the most vulnerable”11. In the end, the Indian government threw its weight behind 
Pachauri, with Jairam Ramesh telling Parliament in March 2010 that he had “full confidence” 
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 Hindustan Times, Did ‘Himalayan blunder’ help TERI get lucrative grants? 25 January 2010. 
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in the “Indian chairperson” of the IPCC, despite the government’s objections to the glacier 
claim being, as he put it, “upheld … we were vindicated”12.  
Re-gaining it – institutional reform and cosmopolitan expertise 
So how might this incident inform our understandings of the geographies of 
credibility in the case of the IPCC? For one, it forces us to recognise the complexities and 
ambiguities of participation and representation. Even though the IPCC associates authors 
with their home countries when listing and counting participants, there is an ambiguity about 
who or what is being represented by these actors (see also Scoones 2009). In an age of 
multiple, fluid and sometimes contradictory identities (Ellison 1997; Appiah 2005), any claim 
that the passport held by an author can lend their ideas the same kind of free mobility enjoyed 
by their bodies is sure to be problematic. This notion of fluid, cosmopolitan identities can 
perhaps also be used to make sense of the label of “Western science”, strategically applied 
here to a body of epistemic and normative claims whose authority is often deferred to, but 
whose credibility is often challenged as a science suited to certain national concerns.  
Theodore Porter (1995) argues that numbers and quantification have been key means 
of attaining credibility across space – of producing mobile, credible knowledge. Since the 
climate science controversies of 2009-10, numbers have increasingly been employed to 
represent not just the state of the climate, but the degree of relevant agreement within the 
scientific community. Numbers like “97%” (Cook et al. 2013) have been used to capture the 
extent of scientific consensus. To paraphrase Porter, such numbers are hoped to unite a 
sceptical and divided polity – particularly those of the US and Australia – around a seemingly 
objective portrayal of scientific unanimity (cf. Bray 2010). Yet similarly intentioned 
statements about the sheer numbers of geographically diverse participants in the IPCC 
process are not by themselves solutions to the problem of global credibility, owing to the 
complexities I outline above. Neither is a simple procedural fix, which has been the dominant 
institutional response to the controversies of 2009 and 2010. In March 2010 the 
InterAcademy Council (IAC) – an international organisation of national science academies – 
was commissioned by UNEP to conduct a formal review of IPCC processes and procedures 
(see IAC 2010, 75). Although stating that “the IPCC assessment process has been successful 
overall” (ibid., xii), the IAC report, published on 1st September 2010, made a series of 
recommendations designed to improve the assessment process. These included: 
 The establishment of an elected Executive Committee; 
 The election of an Executive Director to head the Secretariat; 
 Extra vigilance by Review Editors to ensure that review comments are 
adequately considered, and the reflection of any controversy in the final 
report; 
 A more targeted process for responding to reviews, including a more 
appropriate division of labour between Review Editors and chapter authors; 
 The use of the qualitative level-of-understanding scale in SPMs and 
Technical Summaries; 
 The use of quantitative probability scales only where the evidence allows it;  
 The enactment of a comprehensive communications strategy which could 
help avoid public statements “perceived as advocating specific climate 
policies” (ibid., 5); and 
                                                          
12
 Times of India, Government to fight attempt to unseat Pachauri, 16 March 2010. 
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 The adoption of a ‘rigorous’ conflict of interest policy covering the IPCC 
leadership, authors, review editors and technical support staff. 
The recommendations of the IAC were broadly accepted (see IPCC 2010), and work 
is ongoing within the organisation to formally enact the IAC suggestions. However, the 
mandate, questions and recommendations of the IAC were restricted to a familiar 
instrumentalism which positions ‘sound science’ as separate from, but determinate of, good 
public policy (Demeritt 2006). To paraphrase Shapin (1995), practical solutions to the 
problem of credibility were sought through minor institutional reforms. This defence of the 
‘science for policy’ status quo (Hajer 2012) highlights the strong investment made by both 
the scientific and diplomatic community in the structure and organisation of this kind of 
assessment process, and thus the dominant problem framings to which it has given rise. More 
fundamental questions – like the scalar politics of knowledge-making, epistemic pluralism 
and the need for institutional spaces geared towards more resolutely  deliberative or agonistic 
forms of engagement with climate change (Machin 2013) – were conspicuously absent from 
the IAC agenda. Although increased transparency and accountability were recognised as a 
“growing obligation” (IAC 2010, vi; Beck 2012), this was the only real concession to the 
changes in the nature of political deliberation in the quarter-century since the IPCC’s 
establishment. The diversification since 1988 of the deliberative spaces in which climate 
change is constructed and contested as a governance problem was not recognised by the IAC 
review (Stevenson & Dryzek 2012). New communications guidelines, developed in lieu of 
the IAC recommendations, have renewed the commitment of the IPCC to communicating 
with its “primary audience” of national governments, with a clear firewall enacted between 
the IPCC and broader global publics. Although other assessments like the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD) 
have attempted to enact deliberative spaces responsive to new, distributed systems of public 
deliberation (Scoones 2009), the IPCC clings to a conventional understanding of political 
representation and delegation, with publics defined as those who are tied to and contained by 
a sovereign nation-state (see Brown 2009).   
Even before the staggered publication of AR5 began, a public debate was enacted on 
the future of the IPCC as an organisation. On blogs and in media interviews, participating 
scientists wondered whether the personal and institutional costs to the scientific community 
of producing IPCC assessments were worth the incremental changes in consensus knowledge 
which they represented
13
. The IPCC itself solicited comments from national governments on 
its own future, with suggestions ranging from a continuation of business-as-usual, through the 
provision of more frequent ‘special reports’, to the establishment of a public website where 
assessments could be updated in ‘real time’, without the expansive review process14. The 
Netherlands supported thoroughgoing changes of the latter variety, whereas Brazil and India 
did not contribute suggestions. Most governments promoted closer interaction between the 
scientific and political communities in order to generate more relevant, timely assessments of 
topics of political interest. However, the fate of the Panel’s credibility, in the eyes of many 
contributors, rests on the continued policing of the boundary between ‘policy relevant’ and 
‘policy prescriptive’ science. A Task Group comprised of representatives from 44 
governments and the European Union was thus set up in October 2013 to explore the future 
                                                          
13
 E.g. Scientific American, Does the IPCC need to change? 7 October 2013. 
14
 ‘The Future of the IPCC: Collated comments from Governments’. Document prepared for the 37th 
Session of the IPCC, 14-18 October 2013. 
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of IPCC products and processes, and to look at ways to further the participation of developing 
country scientists.   
This process, along with the preceding IAC review and recommendations, points to a 
strong governmental commitment to the epistemic constitutionalism which positions the 
IPCC as the most important arbiter of credible, politically-relevant scientific advice on 
climate change (Miller 2009). Credibility, in this view, is to be established through social 
relations which position scientists and government representatives in close contact, but with a 
clear firewall between acts of description and prescription. However, I have suggested in this 
article that the social relations of climate change knowledge-making render credibility a 
complicated compound of scientific and political concerns. We of course need to ask how we 
can design assessments capable of embracing knowledge needs at multiple scales and in 
multiple sectors of human activity. But we also need to ask whether a body like the IPCC is 
capable of doing justice to the multiple ways of reasoning about risk and environmental 
change (Jasanoff 2005; Miller 2009; Jasanoff 2011), when such ways of reasoning are 
inextricably bound up with local political cultures and normative priorities. Can the IPCC be 
both scientifically credible and epistemically cosmopolitan, in handling the normative content 
of different, sometimes contradictory ways of reasoning about climate change? Just 
addressing this question will require broadening the processes of consultation and learning 
beyond the epistemic communities currently invested in the IPCC.  
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